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Comments
TOTS-PARENT AND CnL I~a-uNr-SurT AGAINST PARENT'S ESTATE.

Two children were injured while riding in an automobile driven by
their father, who was killed in the accident. The children brought an
action in negligence against their father's estate to recover for personal
injuries. Defendant administrator moved for summary judgment on
the sole ground that an unemancipated minor cannot sue a parent for
negligence. The trial court refused to dismiss the complaint and
entered judgment for the plaintiffs. Defendant appealed. Held:
Affirmed. The common law inability of a minor to sue his parent in
tort ends with the parent's death and does not extend to the parent's
estate. Thurman v. Etherton, (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1970), petition
for rehearingfiled, (Apr. 24, 1970).
It is not clear whether a child could sue his parents in tort at the
early common law,' however treatise writers believed such an action
could be maintained. 2 The only English case reported allowed a tort
action between father and son.3 But in the first American case in
point decided in 1891, the Mississippi Supreme Court held:
...[S]o

long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide,

and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid
and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained.
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.4
I For a comprehensive analysis of the early history of -parent-child tort
immunity see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HAIIv.
L. BEv. 1030, 1059 (1929). McCurdy terms the authorities prior to 1891, "meager,
conflicting, and obscure."
Prosser points out that the problems of legal unity which plagued husbandwife suits were never present in the parent-child relation. W. Pnossmi, Law of

Torts (hereinafter cited as PsossEa) § 116 (3d ed. 1964).
2W.

BLACKsToNE, Com

An4r=crrAs
oN TnE LAws oF ENGLAND

A RE~vs, Dom"mc RELAnONS 287 (1816) states, ".

.

452 (1897).

. a parent may so chastise

his minor
child as to be liable in an action by the child for damages for a battery."
8
Young v. Ranldn [1934] Sess. Cas. 499 (Scot. 1st. Div.). Here the court
made the following remark about the historical antecedents of parent-child

immuIsiere any clearly settled rule or principal of the common law or the
public policy to prevent a son in minority, who had been injured through
the fault of the father, from maintaining an action to be compensated for
his injuries? I can find no such rule or principal, and we were referred
to no judicial formulation of it, if such a rule exists. Id. at 508.

4Hewellett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, -, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
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This decision was uniformly adopted in every American jurisdiction
having occasion to decide the point. 5 For many years immunity of a
parent or child from suit operated as a complete bar to tort actions
for both negligent" and intentional acts. 7
Thus in recent years the rule has been deluged with criticism by
legal scholars 8 and judges.9 The result has been a long series of
exceptions which greatly limit the parent-child immunity rule, and at
least five states have expressly abolished the rule.10 Courts have
allowed suits between parent and child where: (1) the child is eman-

cipated, 1 (2) the injuries were intentionally inflicted, 12 (3) the child
5 Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
6 PRossma § 116.

7 id.
8 See, e.g., Green, Protection of the Family Under Tort Law, 10 HAsTiNGS L.J.
238 (1959); 1 F. HAuPER and F. JAMS, THE LAW OF TonTs § 6.11, at 647 (1956);

Keegan, Family Tort Actions-Liability and Immunity, ILL. L.F. 557; McCurdy,
supra note 1, at 1072; 19 CASE W. RFs. L. BREv. 139 (1967-68); 8 NATuRAL REsoURcEs J. 542 (1968); 6 SAN DIEGo L. REv. (1969); 12 S.D. L. REv. (1968);
35 VA. L. REv. 618 (1968); 17 WAsH. & LEE L. 1Ev. 89 (1960).
9 See the dissenting opinions in: Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d
147 (1961); Badigan v. Badigan, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S. 35
(1961); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
10 Alaska, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York and Wisconsin have
expressly abolished the parents-child immunity rule. Hebel v. Hebel. 435 P.2d 8
(Alas. 1967); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 143 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v.
Briere, - N.H. -, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E.2d 192, 275 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1969); Goller v. White, Wis. -,
122
N.W.2d 193 (1963).
Generally all courts presented the same reasons for abolition of the rule: (1)
It is illogical to sanction property and contract actions between parent and child,
to allow tort actions if the child is emancipated, or if the injuries were
intentionally inflicted, or the injuries occurred in the business of the father, or
where the action is against one who stands in loco parentis and then to deny any
unemancipated minor redress for personal injuries when caused by the negligence
of a living parent; (2) insurance dissipates the old family harmony argument in
nearly all cases; (3) the traditional arguments which have been proffered in
support of the rule simply do not outweigh the necessity of allowing a minor
civil redress of negligent torts against his parents.
It is important to note the Wisconsin court abolished the immunity rule
prospectively only. In a thoughtful decision the court reasoned that prospective
abolition would give the insurance companies time to change their policies if
need be and also stem the flow of state actions if such flow exists. Coller v. White,
supra.
"1Emancipation usually terminates the close family relationship and therefore
the suit would not be so damagin to the family. Wood v. Wood, 135 Caorn. 280,
63 A.2d 586 (1948); Skillin v. Sr m 130 Me. 223, 154 A. 570 (1931); Wurth
v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354
S.W.2d 489 (1962); Clover v. Glover, 44 Tenn. App. 713, 319 S.W.2d 238
(1958); Groh v. Krahn, 223 Wis. 662, 271 N.W. 674 (1937). Partial emancipation
is not 2sufficient. Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 2d 536 295 P.2d 972 (1956).
1 Several courts have held that an intentiona and wilfu tort against a child
is evidence that the parent has abandoned the parent-child relationship and therefore allowed a suit. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939)
(where a father murdered his son). Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335
P.2d 736 (1959); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961
(Continued on next page)
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is injured in the course of business of his father, 13 (4) the action is
brought under the wrongful death act, 14 or (5) the suit is between a
child and one who stands in loco parentis." The present majority
rule is so limited by these exceptions it could be said that liability is
the rule and immunity the exception.
Thurman was a case of first impression in Kentucky, and the Court
followed the modem trend by allowing the suit. But the Court did not
abolish parent-child immunity, instead it merely carved out another
exception. The Court reasoned that the death of one party undermined the policy of the rule, therefore the rule should not be applied.
The Court stated:
The reasons which may have justified barring the child's remedy
against a living parent have lost their compelling significance when
the living family relationship no longer exists. 16
But is this logic sound? Generally the estate will go to the
immediate family by either will or intestate succession. Therefore, a
child's judgment must be paid from the family exchequer whether the
parent is living or dead. It appears a suit against an estate will involve
the same family problems as one against a living parent because a
suit against an estate is a suit against the family as it exists at that time.
Perhaps the Court was looking beyond the immediate case to the
general erosion of the policies supporting family immunity. First, it is
argued that parent-child suits will disrupt family relations. At first
glance this appears to be a sound argument, but it has not been proven
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

(1901); Malinke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 928 (1951); Mayer v. Bitterbush,
196 Misc. 551, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 495 (1949); Brown v. Shelby 206 Tenn. 71, 332
S.W.2d 166 (1960). Contra, Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
13 Where a boy works in his father's business and is injured many courts have
reasoned the boy stands in the shoes of any other employee, and he can therefore
sue for negligence. Dunlop v. Dunlop, 84 N.H. 852, 150 A. 905 (1930); Signs v.
Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d
642, 241 P.2d 149 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
Cf. Worrel v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939). In this case the court
emphasized mandatory employee insurance.
14 Most courts have held that in passing a Wrongful Death Act the legislature
intended to create a cause of action that cannot be abridged by a common law
rule. Harlan National Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1961); Hale v. Hale,
312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950); Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 207, 25
N.E.2d 766 (1940); Albrecht v. PothoA, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934);
Morgan v. Leuck, 137 W. Va. 546, 72 S.E.2d 825 (1962). Contra, Harralson v.
Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
15 Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 434 (1951). This appears to be the weakest of all the
exceptions. Courts have simply held that immunity was limited to the blood parent
in some cases.
16 Thurman v. Etherton, (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1970), petition for rehearing

filed. (Apr. 24, 1970).
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by experience. 17 Children have always been able to sue their parents
in property and contract law,18 but not in tort. Would a suit in tort
be anymore likely to disrupt family relations? It is dilficult to understand why a court would be more zealous in protecting property
rights than personal rights, or why a court would grant monetary
damages under one legal theory but not another.
Often the family relationship is damaged beyond repair long
before a lawsuit is contemplated. Harper and James advocate the
maintenance of an action in tort against a parent or child in every
case "in which it is reasonably clear that the domestic peace has
already been disturbed beyond repair."19 There is no reason why an
action should not be allowed in these cases.
The effect of liability insurance has been considered the final strike
against the parent-child immunity rule by some courts. In abolishing
parent-child immunity, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
We consider the wide prevalence of liability insurance in personal
injury actions a proper element to be considered in making the
policy decision of whether to abrogate parental immunity in negligence actions. This is because in a great majority of such actions,
where such immunity has been abolished, the existence of insurance
tends to negate
any possible disruption of family harmony and
20
discipline.
Secondly, it is contended that abolition of family immunity rule
will undermine a parent's ability to discipline his child. Though a
parental privilege in disciplining children has long been recognized 2'
independent of the parent-child immunity rule, indiscriminate use of
the rule has produced absurd results. In one case the rule was invoked
22
to dismiss a suit by a minor girl who had been raped by her father,
an application hardly in the interest of family harmony.
Finally, it is argued that if the immunity rule is abolished it will
result in fraud and collusion against the insurance companies. The
argument does not explain how the risk of fraud is less in those cases
17 Where suits have been sanctioned under one of the exceptions to parentchild immunity they do not appear to have damaged the family institution. Since
the Married Woman's Act, wives and husbands have been able to sue each other,

with no apparent weakening of the family institution.
18 A child has never been barred from maintaining a contract or property
action against his parent. PRossER § 116. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 1057.
192 F. HAPER & F. JAmms, TnE LAw oF TORTS § 8.11 (1956).
20
Goller v. White, 70 Wis. 2d 402, 405, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
21
P ROSSEM § 27. In order to discipline and teach children a parent must have

a legal right to punish his child, and a parent is privileged in punishing his child
just as
22 a school teacher has a limited privilege of punishment.
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
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allowed by such exceptions as requiring only that the plaintiff-child
have reached legal majority. The potential for fraud is no greater than
in suits between close friends and between persons related other than
as parent and child, especially intersibling suits. Yet a cause of action
is not denied in those cases. If a cause of action was denied simply
because there was an opportunity for fraud and collusion, many torts
outside the family would go without a remedy. Is it justice to deny
an entire class of people a remedy because it is possible that some of
them will pursue fraudulent claims? The possibility of fraudulent
and collusive suits is always present in the common law system of
justice and this threat cannot be properly guarded against by refusing
to allow claims. It is the job of our legal machinery, the judge and
the jury, to ferret out unwarranted claims and lay them to rest.
Moreover, insurance companies have also devised several ways to
protect against fraudulent claims. Most policies include a co-operation
clause which provides that the company will be released from its
contractual obligations should the clause be violated.23 Also, if
insurance companies find fraudulent claims are being lodged, they can
expressly exlude family coverage from their policies.
After nearly a century of life, the parent-child immunity rule is in
full retreat and the catastrophic results which many legal minds
believed would result from intrafamily tort suits simply have not
occurred. The prevalence of liability insurance also tends to negate
any further family trouble where it is present. In any event, uncompensated torts are a dubious device for maintaining family solidarity.
The rule is ripe for abolition and the Kentucky Court might well
do so when presented squarely with the opportunity. It is encouraging
to note at least two judges are in favor of abolishing the rule now. 24
One of the oldest maxims of the common law is cessante ratione legis
cessant ipsa lex (when the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself
ceases). It is submitted that the reasons which may have once
supported parent-child immunity have ceased to exist.
Thomas L. Osborne
23 This is a standard clause in nearly all policies. For a detailed analysis of
the effects of liability insurance on parent-child immunity see Fleming, Accident
Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549
(1948).
24
judge John Palmore and Chief Justice Edward Hill in a short concurring
opinion stated: "The immunity rule is an unrealistic anachronism and should
simply be abolished in so many words." Thurman v. Etherton, (Ky. Ct. App. Mar.
27, 1970), petition for rehearingfiled, (Apr. 24, 1970).

